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“MY ENGLISH IS GOOD ENOUGH” FOR SAN
LUIS: ADOPTING A TWO-PRONGED
APPROACH FOR ARIZONA’S ENGLISH
FLUENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
Maeve Callagy*
INTRODUCTION
Some citizens believe that the rapid growth in the United States
of the Latino population and a substantial minority of Spanish
speakers threaten the “American way of life,” and will lead to the
loss of American jobs.1 This fear manifests itself in state-level laws
that either declare English as the official state language, known
generally as “English Only” laws, or create English fluency
requirements for its public officials.2 Although the tension between
state governments and non-English speakers appears in many areas
throughout the United States, it is especially apparent in Arizona,
whose shared border with Mexico makes it a hub of immigration.3
It was under this contentious context that Alejandrina Cabrera ran
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A., Fordham University, 2010.
I would like to thank my friends and family for their support throughout the
writing and editing process, especially my mother, Anne Callagy, for her edits
and insights, and Andrew Radespiel, whose constant encouragement and humor
was a gift. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the Journal of Law and
Policy for their patience and invaluable suggestions.
1
See, e.g., Thomas E. Lehman, Coming to America: The Benefits of Open
Immigration, THE FREEMAN (Dec. 1, 1995), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/
detail/coming-to-america-the-benefits-of-open-immigration.
2
See Yvonne A. Tamayo, “Official Language” Legislation: Literal
Silencing/Silenciando La Lengua, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 107, 115–17
(1997).
3
See Kris W. Kobach, Op-Ed., Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/opinion/29kobach.html
(“[A]rizona is the ground zero [for] illegal immigration.”).
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for city council in her small border town of San Luis, Arizona.4
Well before the election, however, the Mayor of San Luis filed a
special action in state court and thereby removed her from the
ballot for her lack of fluency in English. 5 The resulting case,
Escamilla v. Cuello,6 frames the issue that many Spanish
speakers—especially those with limited English proficiency—face
in twenty-first century United States. Even though everyday life in
San Luis is conducted in Spanish,7 given that the town is mere
steps from Mexico, the English fluency requirement applies to all
Arizona public officials statewide.8 Thus, a candidate must be
equally fluent in English whether she is running for office in San
Luis or Scottsdale.9
There is a sharp disconnect when the law of a state fails to
reflect the realities of life for each community within its border. In
towns like San Luis, this disconnect ensures that all government
officials are at the same level of fluency in English, regardless of
the need for that level of fluency. Thus, candidates who are less
fluent but are nevertheless competent to serve as public officials in
their area are disqualified based on a requirement that does not
enhance their effectiveness in office. In order to bridge the gap
between the law and reality, Arizona should adopt a sliding scale
of English requirements. The level of English fluency required
should be determined based on the demographics of the
candidate’s potential constituency. This will allow all candidates
who have the requisite level of English fluency needed for their
4

Escamilla v. Cuello, 282 P.3d 403 (Ariz. 2012).
Id. at 404.
6
Id. at 407.
7
See Marc Lacey, Arizona Candidate Challenged Over English Skills,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/us/
arizona-candidates-english-under-challenge.html.
8
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-201(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
9
As the data indicates, Scottsdale is a relatively wealthy, white suburb in
Arizona. Compare San Luis (city), Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/0463470.html (last updated June 27,
2013) [hereinafter San Luis Census], with Scottsdale (city), Arizona, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/0465000.html (last
updated June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Arizona Census]; Scottsdale,
AZ
Demographics,
AREAVIBES,
http://www.areavibes.com/Scottsdaleaz/demographics/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
5
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region to be eligible for public office.
Part I of this Note details the history and circumstances in
Arizona giving rise to Escamilla v. Cuello. Part II examines the
Escamilla decision, describing the parties and background of the
case, as well as analyzing the Arizona Supreme Court’s reasoning.
Part III examines why the decision in Escamilla is problematic,
using Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz10 and the Texas
case Bullock v. Carter11 to shed light on the broader issues of (1)
the freedom to use one’s language as an important expression of
self and (2) the problems inherent in limiting ballot access.
Additionally, Part III discusses the Texas precedent for
government in multiple languages. Finally, Part IV proposes a
two-pronged solution to the problem highlighted in Escamilla: (1)
making the English proficiency law more narrowly tailored to state
interests, and (2) adopting a sliding scale of English fluency for
public officials.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Throughout the history of the United States, there have been
various movements toward establishing the dominance of English
through legislation.12 In 1981, California Senator S. I. Hayakawa
proposed a Constitutional amendment that would have established
English as the official language of the United States.13 Senator
10

2007).
11

Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
See, e.g., Josh Hill, et al, Survey, Watch Your Language! The Kansas
Law Review Survey of Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57
U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 674 (2009); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An
Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REV. 269, 341–50 (1992) (describing the “official English movement”
developed in the 1980s); William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska
in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 132–33 (1988) (detailing how
the First World War led to prejudice against foreign-born populations in
America and the restriction of teaching foreign languages in public schools).
13
S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong. (1981). The proposed amendment was
introduced on April 27, 1981. Id.; see also 127 Cong. Rec. S3998-99 (daily ed.
Apr. 27, 1981) [hereinafter Hayakawa Statement] (statement of Sen. S. I.
Hayakawa).
12
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Hayakawa advocated for English as the official language so that
immigrants would understand that learning English is expected and
necessary upon arriving in the United States, saying “I am
proposing this amendment because I believe that we are being
dishonest with the linguistic minority groups if we tell them they
can take full part in American life without learning the English
language.”14 During the course of his presentation, Senator
Hayakawa pointed to foreign countries in turmoil due to competing
languages, and proclaimed that “[a] common language can unify;
separate languages can fracture and fragment a society.”15 The
amendment failed to pass,16 as have any further attempts at the
national level.17 To this day, the United States remains without an
official language, but as recently as 2006, the Senate approved the
“Inhofe Amendment,” which purported to make English “the
official language of the United States,” though the House of
Representatives did not approve it.18
Since the federal government has not passed Official English
or English Only legislation,19 thirty-one states have enacted laws
declaring English as the official language within their borders.20
14

See Hayakawa Statement, supra note 13; see also John Edwards, Social
Purposes of Bilingual Education: U.S. English, the ELA, and Other Matters, in
LEARNING IN TWO LANGUAGES: FROM CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS IN THE
REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOLS 39, 50 (Gary Imhoff ed., 1990); Why is Official
English Necessary?, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.usenglish.org/view/10 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2013).
15
Hayakawa Statement, supra note 13. Senator Hayakawa mentioned
Canada, with its “paranoid” population of French speakers, as well as Sri Lanka
(Ceylon) to see the potential problems with rival languages. See Sen.
Hayakawa’s Speech, LEGISLATION, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.usenglish.org/view/26 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
16
Language
Legislation
Archives,
LANGUAGE
POLICY,
http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/leg-arc.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
17
The “English Language Unity Act” of 2009, 2011, and 2013 have all
been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, but as yet none have
passed. See Federal Legislation, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.us-english.org/
view/310 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
18
Hill, supra note 12, at 673, 675.
19
While both English Only and Official English laws seek to give English
legal primacy, English Only laws are more restrictive on the use of other
languages. Id. at 673.
20
As of October 4, 2013, thirty-one states have passed “Official-English”

“MY ENGLISH IS GOOD ENOUGH” FOR SAN LUIS

309

These statutes range from laws requiring that English be the only
language used in “government documents, meetings, and all other
official actions,”21 to establishing English as the official language
of the state in a more symbolic way, “similar to the way a state
may declare a state bird, fish, or song.”22 While proposed and
passed under the guise of increasing the use of English, these
statutes have often been prompted partially by an influx of
immigrants and a resulting impulse to assert the dominance of
English.23 Arizona is a prime example of this trend. The state’s
population, due to its location on the border of Mexico, has a
substantial minority of Spanish speakers24 who conceivably could
assert a significant influence over the state government.
Arizona’s history, by virtue of its geography and status as a
border state, is rife with bloody clashes among diverse groups.25
Located in the southwestern United States, Arizona shares a border
with California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and Mexico.
Arizona’s location has led to countless groups passing through the
state for a host of different reasons. These have included Native
American tribes establishing villages throughout the territory,
Spanish explorers looking for fabled cities rich in gold and silver,
and beaver trappers migrating west from the eastern United
States.26 Struggles and tenuous agreements among diverse groups,
who often fought for control, have forged Arizona and gave it the
identity of a “contested” land.27
The U.S. government obtained Arizona from Mexico in 1853
when President James Buchanan purchased it as part of a deal with
Mexican President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.28 The deal
laws. See U.S. States with Official English Laws, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.usenglish.org/view/13 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
21
Hill, supra note 12, at 673–74.
22
Id.
23
Ryan Holeywell, How Language Fits into the Immigration Issue,
GOVERNING (Jan. 2012), http://www.governing.com/topics/publicworkforce/
gov-how-language-fits-into-the-immigration-issue.html.
24
San Luis Census, supra note 9.
25
THOMAS E. SHERIDAN, ARIZONA: A HISTORY xv (1995).
26
See id. at xiv.
27
Id. at xv.
28
Gadsden Purchase 1853–1854, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE
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included two parts: the region north of the Gila River in 1848
under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and the region south of
the Gila River.29 In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed a law
declaring Arizona a U.S. territory,30 and in 1912, Arizona became
the forty-eighth state under President William Taft.31 In 1875,
when Arizona had been a territory for almost twenty years, its
population was “estimated at fifty thousand Indians and twentyfive thousand whites,”32 demonstrating that the EuropeanAmerican33 presence had already been established, but was not yet
dominant in the area. Once Arizona became a state, though, it had
a majority of European-American settlers.34
As of 2012, Arizona’s population consisted of a majority of
“non-Hispanic white persons,” at 57.41%, and a minority of people
“of Hispanic or Latino origin” at 30.2%.35 Although a substantial
minority of Arizona’s population is of “Hispanic or Latino origin,”
HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/GadsdenPurchase
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
29
SHERIDAN, supra note 25, at 52–53, 56.
30
John Stanley, Top Moments Before Statehood: 1. Territory of Arizona
Established, AZCENTRAL, http://www.azcentral.com/centennial/news/articles/
2012/02/09/20120209arizona-centennial-moments.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2013).
31
Arizona Timeline, ARIZ. 100 YEARS, http://www.az100years.org/
az-experience/arizona-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
32
Charles Debrille Poston, History of the Arizona Territory, SHARLOT
HALL MUSEUM, http://www.sharlot.org/library-archives/days-past/history-ofthe-arizona-territory/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
33
Some of the literature regarding settlers in the early United States relies
on the term “Anglo-American” as politically correct, but I wish to include
settlers not of Anglo descent, and so have settled on “European-American” to
describe that group. See SHERIDAN, supra note 25, at 46.
34
According to the 1910 Census, Arizona’s racial composition was 83.9%
White, 14.3% American Indian, 1% Black, and 0.8% Asian. See Arizona – Race
and Hispanic Origin: 1860 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/
tab17.pdf.
35
Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/04000.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). The remainder of the population
was comprised of: 4.5% black persons, 5.3% American Indian and Alaskan
native persons, 3.1% Asian persons, 0.3% Native Hawaiian and other Pacific
Islander persons, and 2.5% persons reporting two or more races. Id.
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the state constitution36 mandates that all government activity be
conducted in English, with some limited exceptions,37 and that
government officials work to promote English.38 The choice of
words in the Arizona Constitution is telling. Although English is
clearly the dominant language in Arizona, the state constitution’s
use of the phrase “representatives of government shall preserve,
protect, and enhance the role of English” illustrates that there is
some perceived threat to English that must be guarded against.39
This perceived threat to English highlights that these laws are
passed at least partly out of fear, rather than concerns about unity
or governmental efficiency.40
A. History of English Only Movement in Arizona
Even before Arizona became a state, its territorial code had a
law requiring persons who would hold “any territorial, county,
precinct or district office” to speak English.41 Today this English
fluency requirement persists in Arizona statute Section 38-

36

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-201(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
Article 28, Section 3(2) goes on to enumerate some exceptions to the
English Only law:
(a) To assist students who are not proficient in the English
language, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law,
by giving educational instruction in a language other than
English to provide as rapid as possible a transition to English;
(b) To comply with other federal laws;
(c) To teach a student a foreign language as a part of a
required or voluntary educational curriculum;
(d) To protect public health or safety; or
(e) To protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of
crime.
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII sec. 3.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Publicity Pamphlet of 1988 – Proposition 106, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF
STATE, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/1988/Info/PubPamphlet/
PubPam88.pdf.
41
Escamilla v. Cuello, 282 P.3d 403, 405 (Ariz. 2012) (quoting Ariz. Civ.
Code 1901, tit. 1, Ch. 14, § 199).
37
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201(C).42 In addition to requiring English fluency for those in
public office, on November 8, 1988, Arizonans voted to add
Article 28 (“the Article”), “English as the Official Language” to
the state constitution.43 This was the culmination of an effort that
began in October 1987 by a group called Arizonans for Official
English.44 The Article covers official actions by government
representatives.45 It provides, among other things, that those
representatives must “protect[] the rights of persons in [Arizona]
who use English,” and “avoid[] any official actions that ignore,
harm, or diminish the role of English as the language of
government.”46 As part of the broader Official English movement
that is largely seen as hostile to non-English speakers,47 the Article
has been subject to legal challenges but remains in force today.
In the wake of the passage of Arizona’s English Only
amendment, then-state employee Maria-Kelley F. Yniguez filed
suit in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. In Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, she claimed that the law was unconstitutional
and violated federal civil rights laws.48 Ms. Yniguez was an
employee of the Arizona Department of Administration and dealt
with “medical malpractice claims asserted against the state.”49 She
was fluent in both Spanish and English, and up until the passage of
the Article in 1988, she had communicated effectively in both
languages with claimants who either only spoke Spanish or who
spoke both Spanish and English.50 Once the Article amended the
Arizona Constitution, Ms. Yniguez feared punishment for using
42

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-201(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII; Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F.Supp 309, 310 (D.
Ariz. 1990), vacating as moot, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43 (1997).
44
Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 310 (1990).
45
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII.
46
Id.
47
English Only Defined, INTERCULTURAL DEV. RESEARCH ASS’N.,
http://www.idra.org/IDRA_Newsletter/January_1996_English_Plus_Not_
English_Only/%22English_Only%22_Defined/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
48
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.
1994).
49
Id. at 1221.
50
Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 310.
43
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Spanish at work.51 Ms. Yniguez’s arguments found favor in the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held the Article to be
unconstitutionally overbroad and too restrictive in prohibiting the
use of languages other than English.52 The court held that while the
state could establish an official language, and “encourage” citizens
to learn English, the complete prohibition of other languages was
unconstitutional and seemed to go against the “spirit of tolerance
and freedom” at the heart of the Constitution.53 Once the matter
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the judgment was
vacated for mootness since Ms. Yniguez had resigned before the
Ninth Circuit decided the case.54 Ms. Yniguez’s vigorous challenge
was ultimately rebuffed, leaving Arizona’s English Only law in
place.55
B. History of Voting Rights in Arizona
Throughout Arizona’s history, Latinos and Native American
Arizonans alike have faced dire discrimination that limited their
ability to participate in government, both as voters and
candidates.56 In 1912, Arizona developed its first English Literacy
Tests that required all voters to be “able to read the Constitution of
the United States in the English language in such manner as to
show he is neither prompted nor reciting from memory, unless
prevented from doing so by physical disability.”57 These literacy
tests operated as a filter to keep non-English speakers from being
able to vote, either through applying the tests to would-be voters,
or as general intimidation tactic that kept them from attempting to
vote at all.58
In 1970, Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”),
which banned all literacy tests for voting purposes. In the case
51

Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1221.
Id. at 1241, 1242.
53
Id. at 1238.
54
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48–49 (1997).
55
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, sec. 1.
56
James Thomas Tucker, et al, Voting Rights in Arizona: 1982-2006, 17 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 283, 283–85 (2008).
57
Id. at 285–86.
58
Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
52
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Oregon v. Mitchell,59 Arizona argued that the VRA was
unenforceable “to the extent that it is inconsistent with the
Arizona’s literacy test requirement.”60 The Supreme Court,
however, found that the VRA’s complete ban of literacy tests
preempted any local Arizona literacy tests under the Supremacy
Clause.61 Therefore, Arizona’s literacy tests were prohibited. In
addition, due to its history of discriminating against minorities,
Arizona was covered under Section 5 of the VRA62 and Section
4(f)(4) of the VRA, known as a Language Minority Provision.63
Language Minority Provisions protect voters’ rights in areas where
“more than five percent of voting age citizens . . . were members of
a single language minority group,” of which less than half of those
citizens were registered to vote or actually did vote.64 Upon finding
that Arizona fell within that category due to its large population of
Spanish speakers, Congress applied Section 4(f)(4), which required
Arizona to “provide[] any registration or voting notices, forms,
instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating
to the electoral process, including ballots . . . in the language of the
applicable language minority group as well as in the English
language.”65 Thanks in part to this legislation, there has been an
enormous growth in the number of Latino representatives in
Arizona government: in 1973, there were ninety-five Latino
elected representatives, and in 2005, there were 373.66 Through the
application of the VRA Language Minority Provisions, the federal
government has recognized that Arizona’s unique composition of
59

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 132.
61
Id.
62
See Tucker, supra note 56, at 288
63
About Language Minority Voting Rights, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_203/activ_203.php (last visited Oct. 4,
2013).
64
Tucker, supra note 56, at 288. Arizona became covered under the 1975
amendments after the federal government determined that, in the 1972 election,
more than five percent of voting-age citizens were members of a single language
minority group, election materials were provided in English Only, and fewer
than fifty percent of voting-age citizens were registered to vote or did vote. Id.;
About Language Minority Voting Rights, supra note 63.
65
About Language Minority Voting Rights, supra note 63.
66
Tucker, supra note 56, at 292.
60
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citizens requires special consideration and monitoring in the voting
context.67 In a similar way, Arizona’s linguistic composition
requires attention to ensure that all are allowed and encouraged to
participate in government, as in running for public office.
II. ESCAMILLA V. CUELLO
The history of Arizona’s discrimination towards Latinos has its
continuation today and came to a head in Escamilla v. Cuello.
Given both the history and geography of San Luis and Arizona as a
whole, it would have been appropriate for the Escamilla court to
accommodate the large proportion of Spanish speakers with a
relaxed interpretation of the English fluency standard set out in
section 38-201(C). Yuma County occupies the southwest corner of
Arizona and shares a border with California and Mexico.68 This
county used to be “the gateway to . . . California,” attracting many
who hoped to strike it rich with gold and also served as a railroad
hub in the mid-nineteenth century.69 On the “southwest corner” of
Yuma County sits the city of San Luis, which “is the border town
to San Luis, Sonora, Mexico.”70 Founded “in 1930, as a U.S. Port
of entry into Mexico,”71 San Luis is the second busiest border
crossing in Arizona, which necessitated the construction in 2009 of
a second port of entry to accommodate commercial traffic. 72 The
city has the distinction of being the “fastest growing small city in
Arizona.”73 Its population as of 2011 was 27,864, up 9.2% from its
2010 population of 25,505.74
67

Id. at 288–89.
Arizona Cities and Counties, ARIZ. GOV’T RES., http://az.gov/
government_county_statemap.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
69
About the County, YUMA CNTY., ARIZ., http://www.co.yuma.az.us/
index.aspx?page=543 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
70
CITY OF SAN LUIS, http://www.cityofsanluis.org (last visited Oct. 4,
2013).
71
Id.
72
San Luis, ARIZ. OFFICE OF TOURISM, http://www.arizonaguide.com/
places-to-visit/arizona-s-west-coast/san-luis (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
73
Id.
74
San Luis Census, supra note 9. The 2011 population is an estimate, as
the census is only conducted every ten years.
68
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As the law in Arizona stands now, English is the official state
language and the sole language of government.75 In order to
participate in government, therefore, one must have the ability to
speak English and effectively communicate in English.76 The
relevant English fluency requirement, section 38-201(C), reads:
A person who is unable to speak, write and read the
English language is not eligible to hold a state,
county, city, town or precinct office in the state,
whether elective or appointive, and no certificate of
election or commission shall issue to a person so
disqualified.77
While maintaining effective governmental communication is a
legitimate state interest, Arizona’s English speaking population is
hardly uniform across the state. In particular, San Luis, in Yuma
County, has a population consisting of 98.7% Hispanic/Latino
persons, 89% of which speak “a language other than English . . . at
home.”78 Compared with Arizona as a whole—of 29.6% of which
are Hispanic/Latino persons, with 27.1% of people speaking a
language other than English at home79—San Luis residents are
affected in larger numbers and, to a greater degree, than the rest of
Arizona.80
This issue came to the forefront in Escamilla v. Cuello. In late
2011, in a race for City Council in San Luis, Guillermina Fuentes,
a friend-turned-political-rival of Alejandrina Cabrera, raised the
issue of removing Ms. Cabrera from the ballot for her alleged lack
of proficiency in English.81 Ignoring any personal reasons behind
75

ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII.
See id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-201(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
77
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-201(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
78
San Luis Census, supra note 9.
79
Id.
80
See Lacey, supra note 7 (noting that in San Luis, Spanish is used for
most everyday interactions, from ordering pizza to seeing a doctor, and even
when police officers communicate with residents).
81
See Richard Ruelas, Politics in San Luis Are Personal, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(May 19, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/arizonaliving/
articles/2012/05/19/20120519san-luis-politics-personal.html. Interestingly, Ms.
Fuentes once operated as Ms. Cabrera’s translator because she knew that Ms.
Cabrera was not fluent in English. Id.
76
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Ms. Fuentes’ questioning of Ms. Cabrera’s English skills, San Luis
Mayor Juan Carlos Escamilla initiated a special action in the Yuma
County Superior Court to remove Ms. Cabrera from the ballot.82
This allowed Mayor Escamilla to replace Ms. Cabrera with Sonia
Cuello, the San Luis City Clerk.83 Following an evidentiary
hearing, the court officially removed Ms. Cabrera from the ballot.
The court relied on testimony from Dr. William G. Eggington, an
expert in linguistics who found that her English skills were
insufficient to meet the needs of a City Councilperson, based on
her failure to adequately understand and answer English questions
posed to her in court.84
On appeal, Ms. Cabrera raised some jurisdictional issues, but
the court found against her and then examined the proficiency
standard itself.85 In its ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court first
noted that even before Arizona was a state, it had laws requiring
English proficiency for those seeking public office, citing the
Territorial Code86 and the Enabling Act.87 The Enabling Act
stipulates that the “ability to read, write, speak, and understand the
English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the
office without the aid of an interpreter shall be a necessary
qualification for all state officers and members of the state
legislature.”88 The trial court had interpreted the current English
proficiency requirement, section 38-201(C), as requiring more than
“minimal or bare proficiency,” lest the statute be “rendered
meaningless.”89 After stating that the court would review the trial
82
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court’s statutory interpretation de novo, it added that there is a
presumption of eligibility for candidates who are running for
office.90 This was an expansion of the presumption of eligibility,
which previously had only applied to those already “elected or
appointed to public office.”91
Despite beginning with the presumption of eligibility, the
Arizona Supreme Court nevertheless found that Ms. Cabrera
lacked sufficient proficiency in English to run for City Council.92
The court found that the facts and testimony from the linguistic
expert supported the trial court’s decision.93 The linguistic expert
had previously testified that “speaking proficiency is the strongest
marker of overall proficiency.”94 Thus, Ms. Cabrera’s ability to
read English at a high-school level was insufficient to qualify her
as proficient in English.95 Cabrera challenged the expert testimony
on the grounds that: (1) Dr. Eggington had not personally
witnessed any City Council meetings and failed to establish what
the required level of English proficiency would be for a City
Councilmember; and (2) Dr. Eggington failed to “account for
Cabrera’s hearing disability.”96 Over these objections, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that Ms. Cabrera was not proficient in English
and therefore her removal from the ballot was justified.97
Ms. Cabrera’s final argument was that her right to participate
in government was unconstitutionally violated.98 However, the
court held that states can establish more stringent criteria for
running for office than for voting.99 The court further held that
Arizona has a legitimate interest in assuring that its elected
90
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officials will be able to communicate, not only with their
constituents, but also with other government officials.100
Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld both the trial court’s
interpretation of section 38-201(C) and its judgment.101 The
Arizona Supreme Court agreed that section 38-201(C) requires
more than “minimal or bare proficiency at speaking, reading, and
writing the English language.”102 The court further held that, as the
Yuma County Superior Court had noted, English proficiency
would be judged in relation to “the duties of the office sought,”
making it a test of functional fluency.103 The court also read into
the law the requirement—not explicit in the statute—that a
candidate must be able to perform the duties of the relevant office
without an interpreter’s help.104 This may be an accurate reflection
of the state’s legislative intent, but it begs the question of what
happens if a public official’s duties involve speaking languages
other than English?
III. THE PROBLEM WITH ENGLISH FLUENCY REQUIREMENTS
INTERPRETED IN ESCAMILLA

AS

Although the Arizona Supreme Court found the legislative
intent to be clear and the test of functional fluency to be
reasonable, an unaddressed problem remains: it is very difficult to
determine what constitutes functional fluency.105 Given that there
are three dimensions of language fluency—reading, writing, and
speaking—and a candidate may have differing degrees of
100
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Interpreter Qualifications, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 15, 18 (2008) (explaining the
extensive process for determining fluency beyond simply listening to an
individual speak).
101

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

320

proficiency in each of them, the Arizona courts had to prioritize the
type of fluency they believed the legislature intended. 106 In this
case, the Arizona Supreme Court prioritized the ability to speak,
guided in part by expert testimony on the matter.107 However,
judging language proficiency is not an exact science, and the
results can depend on what tests are administered.108 The trial court
did not address what level of proficiency is required to carry out
the duties of city councilperson presumably because, in the court’s
view, Ms. Cabrera’s level of English proficiency was low enough
to satisfy the court that she was not functionally fluent.109
Ballot access restrictions that are overly broad and infringe on
voters’ choice to a greater extent than is necessary trigger
Fourteenth Amendment protection, and those restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny.110 In Arizona, the requirement that
candidates for public office be able to read, write, and speak
English fluently limits the choice of voters by narrowing the pool
of candidates. This rule does not serve the state’s interest in having
competent government officials who are able to perform their
duties because the rule is overly broad. Furthermore, it has the
greatest effect on Latinos, the largest linguistic minority in
Arizona.111
A. Bullock v. Carter: The Intersection of Voter Rights and
Ballot Access Restrictions
As the Arizona Supreme Court noted in its opinion in
Escamilla, “there is no general constitutional right to seek or hold
106
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public office.”112 But in Bullock v. Carter,113 which dealt with
excessive filing fees for candidates in Texas, the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the relationship between voter and
candidate rights, stating:
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and
appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise,
and because this impact is related to the resources
of the voters supporting a particular candidate, we
conclude, as in [Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections],114 that the laws must be ‘closely
scrutinized’ and found reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in
order to pass constitutional muster.115
In Bullock, the Court rejected the notion that the Texas ballot
fees were in place to limit the field of candidates to those who
were “serious.”116 The Court found little evidence to support the
purported “relationship between a candidate’s willingness to pay a
filing fee and the seriousness with which he takes his candidacy,”
noting that the issue was one of inability, rather than unwillingness
to pay.117 In addition, the Court found that restrictions on ballot
access always affect voters in some way, explicitly noting that
there is no “neat separation” between laws that affect candidates
and laws that affect voters.118 Thus, the Court found that the filingfee scheme resulted in an illegitimate limitation on voter rights.119
As in Bullock, the effect on voters in Escamilla was “neither
incidental nor remote.”120 Rather than adopt a blanket standard for
what constitutes fluency, the Arizona Supreme Court should
112
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instead have interpreted section 38-201(C) so that the English
language requirement for public officials would be narrowly
tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest. Just as the
ability to pay filing fees did not determine a candidate’s
seriousness in Bullock, a candidate’s incomplete fluency in English
does not necessarily affect their ability to effectively represent an
area.
In analyzing the ballot access restriction presented by Arizona
section 38-201(C), it is instructive to see the parallel between
candidates’ inability to pay filing fees and candidates’ inability to
speak English fluently. While lack of funds and lack of English
skills are not obviously related, they both point to a candidate that
is already at a disadvantage but is still attempting to participate in
government. The filing fees in Bullock became a restriction on the
ballot that was insufficiently related to a legitimate government
interest, because the burden on candidates, especially candidates
for local office, was out of proportion.121 Asking local candidates
to pay as much as $8,900 operated as a complete bar to many,
especially considering the high cost of campaigning in addition to
such fees.122 This excessive burden was relatively simple to
identify and strike down. When it comes to language requirements,
though, the path is less clear. Despite the increased difficulty in
determining the reasonableness of a language requirement, though,
a uniform English fluency requirement is no less burdensome on
candidates like Mrs. Cabrera, and still bears little relation to a
candidate’s ability to hold public office. It is more difficult to
assess language fluency than it is to determine a candidate’s
financial means, but it is also more vital, since language skills are
connected with personal identity, culture, and often times,
prejudice.
B. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz: Value in
Communicating in One’s Native Tongue
The English Only movement and restrictions on the use of
languages other than English in government is not confined to
121
122
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Arizona, or even the southwestern United States. Alaska approved
of the Official English Initiative (“OEI”) in November 1998.123 Its
stated goals were to “‘promot[e], preserv[e] and strengthen[]’ . . .
English as Alaska’s common language and . . . reduc[e] the costs
of conducting government business in multiple languages . . . .”124
The actual text of the law was as follows:
The English language is the language to be used by
all public agencies in all government functions and
actions. The English language shall be used in the
preparation of all official public documents and
records, including all documents officially
compiled, published or recorded by the
government.125
After the OEI was passed, a group of plaintiffs filed suit,
among them were: Moses Kritz, Mayor of Togiak; Stanley Active,
City Councilmember of Togiak; Henry Alakayak, school board
and City Council member in Manokotak; and other community
members, many of whom use both English and another language in
their daily lives.126 Notably, City Councilmember Active is only
fluent in Yup’ik,127 a native Alaskan language.128 These plaintiffs
claimed that the OEI infringed on their freedom of speech,
specifically that it would affect “bi- or multi-lingual government
officials or employees, or citizens who rely on such individuals to
communicate with or participate in local and state government.”129
123
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Like Arizona, Alaska is a state that has many languages spoken
within its borders, as Judge Fred Torrisi explained in the superior
court decision striking down the OEI.130 Mayor Kritz and City
Councilor Active represent Togiak, a small town in southwestern
Alaska on the coast of the Bering Sea. Togiak is not unlike San
Luis, as “there [are] a significant number of people . . . who do not
speak English, or who speak it only superficially.”131 In the town
of Togiak, the government essentially operates in two languages:
Yup’ik and English. Government officials and employees
translate,132 similar to San Luis city council meetings, where the
question-and-answer sessions are often in Spanish, or police
patrols where officers “communicate over the radio in English, but
interact with residents in Spanish.”133 In Togiak, English is not a
requirement for being on the ballot or being a public official, and
there are in fact many community leaders who cannot speak
English at all.134
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the OEI “violates the
federal and Alaska constitutional rights to free speech and to
petition the government” and thus found it “unconstitutional as
enacted;” however, the second sentence of the OEI remains in
force because it was severable from the offending portions.135
What is left in the OEI now reads “the English language shall be
used in the preparation of all official public documents and
records, including all documents officially compiled, published or
recorded by the government,” which is constitutional because it
affects governmental communications without overly burdening
citizens’ rights to petition the government.136 In the course of its
130
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decision, the court noted that once English is mandatory for all
government-related communications, “some voices will be
silenced, some ideas will remain unspoken, and some ideas will
remain unchallenged.”137 Ultimately, therefore, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that stifling native Alaskan culture and its
distinct perspective, as well as the other languages and cultures
within Alaska, was impermissible.138 Arizona should recognize, as
Alaska did, that while governmental efficiency and state-wide
standards may demand a uniform level of English fluency, such
policies exclude candidates with unique ideas and passion for
representing their communities.
Today, there are twenty native Alaskan languages spoken in
Alaska, although only two, Siberian Yupik and Central Yupik, are
taught to children as their first language at home.139 Groups such as
the Alaska Native Language Center (“ANLC”) have created
initiatives dedicated to the preservation of native Alaskan
languages.140 Established in 1972, the ANLC’s stated mission is to
“research and document[]. . . [] . . . the twenty Native languages of
Alaska.”141 The ANLC also helps teach native languages at schools
throughout the state, and informs the public of the current problem
of native “language loss.” The ANLC believes that “like every
language in the world, each of those twenty is of inestimable
human value and is worthy of preservation.”142 The “human value”
is partly that each language is unique and represents a particular
group of people, and perhaps more important, that an individual’s
native language is an element of his or her identity.143 In order to
137
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understand the full impact of the loss of a language, it is necessary
to recognize that language goes beyond simply using certain
words, and instead implicates an entire culture, mentality, and way
of seeing the world.144 Languages imbue their speakers with a
certain worldview that comes through in the phrasing used, as well
as the words themselves.145 Even among English speakers in the
United States, speech patterns, accents, and colloquialisms indicate
different cultural experiences and places of origin.146 Thus, the
difference in self-identification between English speakers and
speakers of other languages is even starker.147
A popular example of this is found in Australia. Members of
the Aboriginal community use the cardinal directions—North,
South, East, and West—when describing locations or giving
directions, while English speakers use the auto referent left, right,
behind, in front.148 More notable than the simple use of these terms
to describe location is that the Aboriginals are aware of where
North is at all times, arguably because their language demands it of
them.149 This phenomenon is a striking example of a language
influencing how its speakers describe their world, but such effects
are not confined to the Aboriginal people. Speakers of languages
with feminine and masculine nouns, such as German, Spanish, or
French, while understanding that objects do not have a gender, are
144
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more inclined to describe nouns, when asked, in terms that
emphasize one gender over another.150
Different languages do not only have different words, but also
different conversational norms. Some speakers are accustomed to
expressing themselves in a certain pattern, such as either allowing
silence or chattering to fill it up.151 With such a complex web of
culture and language woven into our personal identities, creating a
symbolic official language, or forbidding the use of other
languages within government altogether, erodes the culture of
native speakers. This erosion alienates people from their native
cultures, and can be harmful on a deep level.152
Although accommodating a multiplicity of languages can cause
the government to incur substantial economic costs, attempting to
legislate other languages away can violate an extremely personal
attribute and have high social costs.153 Furthermore, convenience
or governmental efficiency cannot justify English Only legislation
since the movement itself, at least in Arizona, began as a defensive
response to immigrants. Since one’s native language is so tied to
the way in which one thinks about the world, and ultimately,
oneself, passing legislation like English Only laws conveys that
those who speak other languages are not welcome. 154 Such
legislation may encourage monolingual pockets within cities and
150
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states in which languages other than English dominate—such as
Chinatown in New York City,155 or cities like San Luis156—to
become more inward-looking, furthering the cycle of alienation
from the greater population.157
C. Multilingual Government: The Possibility of Total Inclusion
as Seen in the Republic of Texas
In the United States, government is run almost entirely in
English. Some believe that the debate about whether English
should be the official language essentially boils down to
“immigrants should learn English, this is America.”158 But in the
not-too-distant past, in response to practical concerns about the
diversity of its population, the Republic of Texas ran its
government in multiple languages so that all government officials
and citizens could communicate with each other.159 Texas, like
Arizona, began as part of Mexico and slowly became dominated
by European-American settlers on the frontier of the United
States.160 Once Mexico fought for and won its independence from
Spain in 1821, the Mexican government asked European-American
settlers to “fill in the empty spaces” in Texas and invited them to
the region.161 Soon thereafter, those settlers outnumbered the
Mexican inhabitants by a staggering ten-to-one margin, and in
1835, a group of rebel settlers successfully wrested the territory
155
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from Mexican hands.162
Interestingly though, before Texas became independent from
Mexico, the wave of European-American immigrants to Mexican
Texas in the 1820s and 1830s caused the Mexican government to
“add[] English as a language of government.”163 Since English was
the only language that “virtually all of the immigrants” understood,
the Mexican government and the immigrants were in agreement
that the “local government within the [European-American]
settlements could be conducted in English.”164 Since documents
going to and from the central government of Mexico had to be in
Spanish, municipalities set aside money in their budgets to provide
for translators.165 Despite this accommodation, one of the stated
reasons by Texans for declaring independence from Mexico was
that government business took place in an “unknown tongue.”166
The Texans’ demand for government to be in a language they
spoke fluently was reasonable, yet in the contemporary context,
proponents of English Only legislation, among others, see it as
catering to illegal immigrants.167
Once Texas became independent from Mexico, English
overtook Spanish as the dominant language of the region.
However, the Republic of Texas, as it was then known, retained
the sense that its citizens had a right to understand the language of
government and provided government services in Spanish,
German, Norwegian, Czech, Polish, and Wendish168 during the late
nineteenth century.169 Rather than declare English the official
162
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language, the fresh memory of being excluded from government
led the Republic of Texas to have a bilingual government. 170 Texas
currently has no official language, though a few initiatives within
the states have attempted to establish English as its official
language.171
Today, the dominant narrative that English is the only language
that should apply in the United States overshadows the possibility
that a government can operate in multiple languages. A look at the
European-American immigrants to Mexican Texas and their
struggle for full representation and inclusion parallel the situation
in modern day Arizona. Despite the history of demands for
government to be provided to citizens in a language they
understand,172 and the recognition of language’s inherent value in
places like Alaska,173 English Only laws and the English fluency
requirements implemented by Arizona remain lawful.
IV. TWO-PRONGED SOLUTION TO ESCAMILLA
In the absence of entirely abolishing English fluency
requirements for running for public office, Arizona should follow
the Republic of Texas’ example of pragmatic language inclusion.
To that end, I propose a two-pronged solution to make the English
fluency requirement more concrete and specific and to ensure that
it is related to a legitimate state purpose. The first prong addresses
the unconstitutional vagueness of section 38-201(C) by specifying
what level of proficiency is required on a particular test. The
second prong creates a sliding scale that will adapt these
proficiency requirements based on the demographics of the area
each candidate would represent in office.
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A. Vagueness
The current phrasing of the Arizona statute rejects all
candidates who are unable “to speak, write, and read the English
language.”174 This law, while clearly favoring candidates who are
completely fluent in English, is too vague by not establishing a
floor for candidates of what constitutes English proficiency. The
standard “able to speak, write, and read”175 does not give guidance
to whether a candidate must be equally proficient in speaking,
writing, and reading, or if there is one measure of fluency that is
more important than the others. Thus, the law is improperly vague
and must change.
The theory of unconstitutional vagueness arose in the context
of penal laws. There was a fear that some individuals might break
the law without realizing it and thus be deprived of their due
process rights.176 Generally, a statute must be able to be understood
by a person of “ordinary intelligence,” and it must not encourage
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”177 Courts have held
that when a law is vague and fails to alert those who might break it
unknowingly, or leads to various interpretations by enforcement
agencies, it violates due process.178 The English fluency laws, then,
must have requirements that are comprehensible to a person of
normal intelligence and give a clear indication as to what level of
fluency and what form, or forms, of fluency are required for each
position.179 The law must also include an objective testing
mechanism, so that individual judges or linguistic experts cannot
impose a particular favorite test. This will allow for uniform
application of the law and remove some of the court’s discretion,
which will in turn provide more consistent and predictable
174
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outcomes.
According to San Luis residents, some of whom spoke out in
the wake of Ms. Cabrera’s removal from the ballot, the city
operates primarily in Spanish—from its local commerce to entire
portions of City Council meetings. One resident even commented
that “it’s strange to speak English” in the city.180 Based on San
Luis’s demographics and the population’s use of Spanish,181 the
reasonable candidate might conclude that a working knowledge of
Spanish and some proficiency in the language should be required
in order to adequately represent its residents.182 The test for
language fluency is too ambiguous183 for a San Luis candidate of
“ordinary intelligence”184 to articulate the English fluency level
required to run for office. Thus, candidates are unable to know if
they are violating the law since they do not know if it applies to
them. It is also inefficient to force candidates like Ms. Cabrera to
waste time resources on a truncated campaign.185
Section 38-201(C) lacks an articulated standard by which to
judge proficiency and a concrete level of proficiency that must be
achieved. The law determines English fluency by whether the
candidate is able to “speak, write, and read the English
language.”186 This could conceivably lead a San Luis candidate of
normal intelligence to various understandings of what the law
requires. It is not clear if a candidate needs total fluency in
180
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speaking, writing, and reading English or merely enough English
to “get by.”187 Ms. Cabrera is a perfect example of what can occur
when the candidate believes they meet that second, more relaxed
interpretation of section 38-201(C).188
While professionals and those who have extensive knowledge
of linguistics are certainly useful, each fluency assessor is likely to
have a slightly different opinion on a would-be candidate’s English
proficiency. In order to combat this natural variation among
experts, an objective test of language skills would be preferable.
The Escamilla decision used a linguistic expert to determine Mrs.
Cabrera’s fluency in English.189 In the course of his questioning of
Ms. Cabrera, the expert concluded that Ms. Cabrera could read
English at a ninth or tenth grade level but could not speak or
maintain a conversation beyond “certain courtesy requirements.”190
The Arizona Supreme Court repeatedly noted that section 38201(C) simply asks that a candidate be proficient enough in
English to perform his or her official duties without an interpreter,
but fails to determine what level is necessary, the very essence of
the question at hand.191 Although Ms. Cabrera fell short of what
the court considered functionally fluent for the position of City
Council member, her case reveals how difficult it is to draw an
exact line to allow future candidates to know what level of
proficiency is required.192
To remedy this, the Arizona statute could specify what
numerical score on a particular proficiency exam is sufficient for
various offices. This will allow candidates to know what level they
need to achieve and what methods will be used to measure their
ability. There are a variety of tests already in use for the purpose of
187
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testing English proficiency;193 two of the most popular, the TOEFL
and academic IELTS tests, are geared toward testing non-native
English speakers who wish to attend English-speaking colleges or
universities.194 However, since the Arizona law emphasizes
functional fluency in the environment of a particular public office,
an academic proficiency exam would be overly rigorous and not
well-tailored. Instead a test such as the non-academic IELTS or the
MTELP, both of which “test the non-native English speaker’s
effectiveness in the working world,”195 may be better suited to the
purposes of Arizona’s English proficiency law. These tests
encompass reading, writing, speaking, and listening skills, and the
Arizona legislature could choose which to emphasize, as many
colleges and universities do.
By standardizing the proficiency test and score needed to be
considered functionally fluent, Arizona will avoid the type of
subjective conclusions which occurred in Escamilla. This will
allow candidates the ability to judge their own knowledge of
English and whether or not to proceed with a campaign. This
approach will be more efficient, as well as eliminate the vagueness
present in section 38-201(C).
B. Sliding Scale
In order to set the appropriate level of English fluency needed
for each area in Arizona, a sliding scale will take into account the
linguistic composition of each political subdivision. In the past,
candidates who challenged requirements that kept them off the
193
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ballot tended to call for respect for voters’ rights, which would
allow a higher level of scrutiny than for candidates’ rights alone.196
By their operation, specific requirements for candidacy limit the
pool of candidates from which voters may choose for elected
office. This has led courts to hold that there is no clear separation
between the right to run for office and the right to vote, though the
latter remains more fundamental.197 Given the link between voter
rights and the right to run for political office, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the restrictions on who may run must be
“reasonably necessary to accomplish legitimate state” goals.198
Nevertheless, certain ballot access restrictions are necessary. If
there are too many candidates on the ballot for any given office the
voter could become confused or overwhelmed.199 Necessary ballot
restrictions reasonably limit the number of names and platforms,
allowing the state to ensure that every candidate who appears on
the ballot is “serious[] . . . and motivat[ed] . . . .”200 The
seriousness and motivation question often manifests itself through
a requirement that a candidate gather a certain number of
signatures in order to have his or her name on the ballot. This is to
show that there is real support among voters, and that the candidate
is willing and able to perform the groundwork necessary to be on
the ballot.201 However, courts have held that ballot access
restrictions that bear no relation to the state interest it purports to
serve are illegitimate and must be voided.202
The requirement set out in Arizona’s Section 38-201(C), as
interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Escamilla, is
insufficiently related to the legislative intent that only candidates
who are able to perform their duties without the help of an
interpreter are eligible.203 The Escamilla court’s interpretation of
196
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the law is overly burdensome and will ultimately disqualify
candidates who could be effective representatives despite being
less than fluent in English. Adopting a sliding scale204 of English
requirements could remedy this problem. A sliding scale for
judging proficiency can be based on a formula that calculates
factors like the number and concentration of speakers of a
particular language to assess the necessary proficiency for a public
official in that area. It could look at a particular town or
Congressional district and determine the prevalence of English and
of other languages in the relevant area, and thus be more
specifically tailored to the language composition there.205 Using
that data, each district would set the required reading, speaking,
listening, and writing comprehension level that each candidate
should achieve on a particular English competency exam. The
Escamilla court said that a candidate only needed sufficient
fluency in English but subsequently failed to describe what
constitutes “sufficient fluency.”206 The court actually did mention,
however, that Mrs. Cabrera could “read[] at a ninth or tenth grade
reading level,” which would satisfy the fluency requirement, had it
only taken reading comprehension into account.207 In this way, a
sliding scale based on the demographics of a particular area would
comport with the Arizona Supreme Court’s own rationale in
Escamilla by setting a sufficient level for each aspect of fluency.
This would yield a language proficiency standard for candidates
that reflected the area they would represent and be reasonably
related to the goal of having competent elected officials.
Currently, candidates in San Luis are not required to have
complete fluency in English, unlike candidates for the U.S. Senate
or governor of Arizona, and this is largely because of the
demographics of San Luis.208 Running for local office in a city like
204
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San Luis, where the vast majority of the population speaks
Spanish209 in its daily interactions,210 is a far cry from running for
local office in a city like Scottsdale, Arizona, where less than ten
percent of the population is of “Hispanic or Latino origin.”211 The
Arizona Supreme Court has already recognized that English
proficiency is only tied to the level necessary for a particular
office.212 Since that level is demonstrably lower in places like San
Luis, due to the large Spanish speaking population, a sliding scale
would be an effective way to adjust the English requirement to
elucidate the standard the court set forth in Escamilla. This sliding
scale would ensure that candidates in Arizona would know what
level of proficiency is required for public office.
CONCLUSION
The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Escamilla highlights
a growing problem for Arizona—and the United States as a
whole—as minority populations grow and become more politically
assertive.213 English is Arizona’s de facto dominant language, as
well as its official language,214 but this dominance belies the reality
of a far more linguistically diverse state.215 Arizona’s history
shows a trend of barriers erected to keep non-English speakers out
of the government, both as voters and candidates. Arizona has used
literacy tests and intimidation, and now English fluency
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requirements, in its state law and the constitution.216 In the past,
fear of losing cultural dominance prevented non-English speakers
from participating in government, and legislative action, like the
VRA, sought to remove the obstacles non-English speakers face.217
Now, the Arizona legislature must respond to the issue of
minority—specifically Latino—exclusion in its present form: the
English fluency requirement.
Absent a complete repeal of the requirement that public
officials be fluent in English, the Arizona legislature must further
refine the law. This will ensure that the law is not
unconstitutionally vague and is narrowly tailored to serve a
legitimate government purpose. Arizona can further its legitimate
government purpose of promoting a functioning government
through two measures. First, choosing a specific means of testing
English fluency, and second, assigning a target score through
demographic-based calculations operating on a sliding scale. Such
changes to the law will make potential candidates aware of how it
applies to them and will remove the infringement of their rights.
Arizona is in a unique position to celebrate its linguistic and
cultural diversity, in light of its history of many groups coming
together to form a vibrant patchwork. The English fluency
requirement of section 38-201(C)—along with the broader English
Only amendment to Arizona’s constitution—only serve to alienate
and undermine those citizens who are not native English speakers
or whose culture is tied to another language such as Spanish.
Adapting this English fluency requirement with the sliding scale as
described will be a step towards cultural openness that can only
enhance its government, as a greater range of opinions and ideas
will be accepted.
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